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THE WIDOW'S ELECTION TO TAKE
AGAINST A WILL*
II.

EVIL EFFECTS OF THE WIDOW'S ELECTION AGAINST THE WILL

A. Interference With Testator's Intention
Where the testator fails to anticipate his widow's election against
the will and consequently does not provide for the distribution of the
property which remains after the widow is given her share, the widow's
election ordinarily results in a disruption of the testator's dispositive
plan. Such interference is justified only when the widow's election is
prompted by the desire to provide financial protection for herself
and/or her children. Otherwise, the policy behind the widow's statutory rights under Section 233.14 of the Wisconsin Statutes is not being
furthered, and the sanctity which Wisconsin law gives to a testator's
right to have his will carried out' is being violated. Thus, where the
widow takes against the will even though she would be adequately cared
for without so electing, the interference with the testator's intention
is wholly unjustified, and constitutes an evil effect of the widow's
election.
B. Difficulty Determining Who Bears Loss Occasioned by
Widow's Election
Another evil brought about by the widow's election, and the one
with which we will be primarily concerned, is the difficulty which the
courts experience in determining the method of distribution of the
property which remains in the testator's estate after the widow's share
has 'been taken. Since the property remaining subject to the will is
usually less than it would have been had the widow abided by the will,
the problem is essentially one of determining which testamentary beneficiaries must bear the loss occasioned by the widow's election.
As was mentioned above, if the testator expressly provides how the
loss is to be borne, such provision will be carried out. 2 However, the
cases are few in which testators have had such foresight.3 In some
jurisdictions statutes regulate the incidence of the loss, but these enactments have been of little help. Because of the many varied fact
situations which arise, questions as to the construction, application, and
4
effect of the statutes are frequently before the courts.
*This is the second of three installments of this article. The first installment,

discussing the situations where a widow may elect against her husband's will,
appears in 37 Marq. L. Rev. 365. The present installment is concerned with the
evil effects of a widow's election. The third installment will take up possible
remedial measures and will appear in a subsequent issue of the Review.
1 See Scheller, The Right to Dispose of Property by Will, 37 MARQ. L. REv. 92,
94, 95 (1953), and cases cited.

2 See the first installment of this article, 37 MARQ. L. REv. 365, 366 (1954).
3 Ibid. at 365.
4 To illustrate, ILL. Rzv. STAT. C.3, §202 (1953) provides that the probate court
"shall abate from or add to the legacies in such a manner as to equalize pro-
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Where there is neither a statute nor an express provision in the
will regarding the method of distribution, the courts rely on the
"presumed intent" of the testator in carrying out the provisions of the
will. That is, the testator is presumed to have known of the possibility
of an election against his will,5 and the will is therefore construed as
if drawn with such possibility in mind.6 Although the presumed intent
of the testator is probably the best available standard in the absence
of an expressed intent, it is quite unrealistic. On this point the late
Professor Page commented:
"In most cases this is a fictitious explanation. If testator
really contemplates the possibility of an election against the will,
he is likely to make a provision for such event in terms so clear
that the rules of construction which are here given have no
place. '"
The rules of construction to which Professor Page referred have been
adopted by the courts in an effort to ascertain the testator's presumed
intent. These rules vary so much in different jurisdictions under almost
identical circumstances that it appears that testators of different states
have different intentions.
The controversies in the various jurisdictions revolve around two
main problems: whether disappointed beneficiaries have a right to compensation out of the provisions renounced by the widow, if any, and/or
whether they have a right to contribution from other testamentary
beneficiaries of the same or a different class.
Many complex subsidiary questions arise in connection with each
of these primary problems. Appellate case law in the various jurisdictions has not answered all the questions, and those answers which have
been given illustrate the inconsistent opinions which must inevitably
result from the use of such a loose standard as the testator's presumed
intent. There has been a great deal of literature on each of the various
aspects of the distribution of the loss occasioned by a widow's election,
so we shall not attempt a detailed analysis of the entire problem. But
we shall discuss generally the most important points, referring to Wisconsin law where our court has passed on the questions, in the hope
portionally the loss or advantage resulting therefrom." In Lewis v. Sedgwick,

223 Ill. 213, 79 N.E. 14 (1906) the statute was construed so as to prefer
specific to residuary legacies. In Dunshee v. Dunshee, 263 111. 188, 104 N.E.
1100 (1914) the court held that the statute was inapplicable to devises. Also,
see Notes, 99 A.L.R. 1197, 1198 (1935) ; 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 602, 608 (1910).
5
Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936); Johnson v. Stringer, 159
Md. 315, 148 A. 447 (1930) ; In re Povey's Estate, 271 Mich. 627, 261 N.W.

98 (1935) ; In re Estate of Hunter, 129 Neb. 529, 262 N.W. 41 (1935).
6 Bross v. Bross, supra, note 5; Johnson v. Stringer, supra, note 5; Crocker v.
Crocker, 230 Mass. 478, 120 N.E., 110 (1918); In re Povey's Estate, .supra,
note 5; Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 A. 804 (1917); Will of Marshall,
239 Wis. 162, 300 N.W. 157 (1941).
74 PAGE, LAw oF WiLLS 88 (3d ed. 1941).
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that we can make Wisconsin attorneys aware of the many complex
problems brought about by a widow's election where remedial precautions have not been taken.
However, before we can begin our consideration of the questions
of compensation and contribution, we must determine what property is
taken to make up the share which goes to the widow upon her election.
Then we shall know which testamentary gifts are impaired and how
the questions of compensation and contribution arise.
(1) What Property Makes Up Widow's Share Under Section
233.14
Section 233.14 gives the widow the following property: her dower
under Section 233.01, i.e., a one-third portion of all the lands whereof
her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during
the marriage; an estate in the homestead for life or until remarriage;
and one-third of the husband's net personal estate. Even though the
realty is specifically devised, the widow gets her rights in the homestead8 and a one-third portion of each parcel of non-homestead realty.9
However, in regard to the widow's share of the personalty, specific
and general bequests are entitled to be met in full so long as the personalty in the residue is sufficient to meet the widow's share and the
will does not manifest a contrary intent. 10 Thus, in Wisconsin, a
testamentary beneficiary of land, no matter whether the gift be specific,
demonstrative, general, or residuary, must give up to the widow onethird of the value of each piece of non-homestead realty and an estate
for the widow's life or until her remarriage in the homestead. Regarding personalty, residuary beneficiaries may lose their entire gifts, and
beneficiaries of the higher classes may also suffer loss on the occurrence
of either of two contingencies: (1) a manifestation of such intent in
the will, or (2) lack of sufficient residual personalty to make up the
widow's share. Consequently, the question arises as to whether the
disappointed beneficiaries should be compensated for the losses they
sustain by reason of the widow's election.
(2) Compensation of Disappointed Beneficiaries From Provisions
Renounced by Widow
(a) In General
Where a widow by taking under the law renounces testamentary
provisions in her favor, the courts ordinarily sequester the property
8 WIs.

STATS.

(1953) §233.14.

§233.01; Will of Marshall, supra, note 6. In Will of
Marshall part of the non-homestead realty was specifically devised and
part was included in the residue. The widow was given dower in each parcel
specifically devised as well as in those parcels passing under the residuary
clause.
20 Will of Muskat, 224 Wis. 245, 271 N.W. 837 (1937).
9

Wrs. STATs. (1953)
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renounced and use it to compensate beneficiaries whose gifts are impaired by the widow's election." However, compensation is not based
on disappointment in expectation, but on the probable intent of the
testator. 12 Where the will expressly or impliedly precludes compensation, it will not be granted.' 3 Thus, we have the first of the rules of
construction to which we have referred. Although the rule appears
to be logical and equitable, it of course has the defect of any rule of
construction, i.e., the difficulty in ascertaining when a contrary intent
is sufficiently manifested.
It has been held that where beneficiaries of both specific and
residuary gifts are disappointed by the widow's election, the specific
beneficiaries are to be preferred over the residuary beneficiaries in the
matter of compensation from the renounced property, because of the
generally favored position of specific gifts in regard to questions of
abatement. 14 There are no Wisconsin cases in point, so we cannot tell
with certainty how the Wisconsin Supreme Court will hold on this
question. However, Wisconsin also favors specific gifts in regard to
abatement,' 5 as well as with respect to creditors' suits against will
beneficiaries, 6 and the manner of apportioning the widow's distributive
share of personalty when she takes against the will.' 7 So, there is at
least a good possibility that Wisconsin will follow this rule.
(b) Where Widow Renounces a Life Interest
When the widow renounces a life interest and no demand is made
for compensation out of the renounced provision, the remainder is
accelerated as though the widow were dead, unless a contrary intent
appears in the will.' 8 However, -where disappointed beneficiaries request compensation, a conflict arises between the doctrine of acceleration of the remainder upon the widow's election and the doctrine of
112 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE 464 (5th ed. 1941). See Notes, 5 A.L.R.
1628, 1629 (1920); 99 A.L.R. 230, 231, 232 (1935); 125 A.L.R. 1013, 1014
(1940). Contra, Gainer v. Gates, 73 Iowa 149, 34 N.W. 798 (1887).
12 Pace v. Pace, 271 Ill. 114, 110 N.E. 878 (1915) ; Hesseltine v. Partridge, 236
Mass. 77, 127 N.E. 429 (1920) ; In re Povey's Estate, supra, note 5; Will of
Marshall, supra, note 6.
13 Crocker v. Crocker, supra, note 6; In re Kahl's Estate, 336 Pa. 376, 9 A2d
346 (1939).
14 Page v. Rouss, 86 W.Va. 305, 103 S.E. 289 (1920).
WIs. STATS. (1953) §313.28.
1CWxs. STATS. (1953) §287.21.
17
8 Supra, note 10.
'5

' Sherman v. Flack, 283 Ill. 457, 119 N.E. 293 (1918); Young v. Harris, 176
N.C. 631, 97 S.E. 609 (1918); Will of McIlhattan, 194 Wis. 113, 216 N.W.
130 (1927). Note, however, that where the remainder is contingent an incidental problem presents itself, i.e., whether the remainder can be accelerated
prior to the occurrence of the contingency upon which it is limited. The courts
have split on this question, but the later decisions are in favor of allowing
acceleration. See Note, 5 A.L.R. 473, supplemented by 17 A.L.R. 314, 62
A.L.R. 206, and 164 A.L.R. 1433.
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sequestration of the renounced provision for compensation of disappointed beneficiaries. 19
Of course, testamentary intent as to which doctrine shall prevail
is controlling, but difficulty in ascertaining such intent has resulted in
inconsistent holdings. The only test which has been offered is that of
the American Law Institute, which has formulated the rule that the
renounced interest is sequestered when "there is no manifestation of a
contrary intent" and (1) the satisfaction of the widow's share causes
a "substantial distortion among the other testamentary dispositions" or
(2) the acceleration of the remainder is excluded by the manifestation of a contrary intent.20 "Distortion" is said to exist whenever
satisfaction of the widow's share "operates otherwise than to decrease
or increase such other dispositions proportionately."' 21 This rule has
been of little influence, since few courts have even cited it. However,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has made reference to it in the dicta of
two decisions, Will of Muskat" and Will of Marshall." In each of
these cases sequestration was denied because of a finding of contrary
testamentary intent, but the dicta stated that there was also a lack of
substantial distortion.
The application of the Restatement rule in these dicta has been
criticized in an article in the Wisconsin Law Review. 2 4 The author
quarrels with the implications from the cases that (1) no distortion
exists when the gifts of specific and residuary beneficiaries are diminished in the same proportion, 25 and that (2) the 'benefits a disappointed beneficiary will receive if the remainder is accelerated to him
are not to be considered in determining whether there is a distortion. 26
Regarding the first implication, the author points out that it is not
in accord with the ordinary rules of abatement. nor with the definition
of residue as given in In re Bradley's Will.2 7 This case held that no
residue exists until after the payment of all charges and burdens, including the widow's statutory share. The author says:
Under that definition of residue it is difficult to conceive
29 However, when a court decides in favor of compensation, it does not necessarily have to resort to sequestration. An alternative method of compensation,
involving both acceleration aiid sequestration, was used in Tomb v. Bardo, 153
Kan. 766, 114 P2d 320 (1941). That is, the remainder was accelerated, but
there was a charge on the accelerated property in favor of the disappointed
beneficiaries. Whether this remedy or sequestration is to be used depends
as to which is more efficient.
2 0 upon judicial choice
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §234 (1936).
1RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY §234(h) (1936).
22 Supra, note 10.

2

23

Supra, note 6.

24 Note, Wills-Renunciation by Widow--Sequestration to Compensate Devisees,

1942 Wis. L. REv. 312.

Will of Marshall, supra, note 6, 239 Wis. at 174, 300 N.W. at 162.
28Ibid.; Supra, note 10, 224 Wis. at 249 and 250, 271 N.W. at 838.
27123 Wis. 186, 101 N.W. 393 (1904).

25
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of the residue's being diminished by the widow's election so that
diminution
of a specific devise would not amount to distor28
tion."
As to the second implication the author states:
"... . It would seem that where the respective losses of dif-

ferent groups of beneficiaries are compared, the fact that one
group gains, by having their interests in remainder accelerated,
would be very important. It is possible that such gain may, in a
given case, exceed the loss due to the widow's election. If so,
it is difficult to justify accelerating instead of sequestering
simply, because losses were proportional in the first instance .

.

2

However valid these criticisms of the Restatement's rule of construction may be, Will of Marshall demonstrates even more significantly the strained holdings to which the courts will resort in attempting to
find a testamentary intent sufficient to prevail over the various rules
of construction. This case held that when the testator provided that
"all lapsed devises and bequests" were to go to the residue, he intended
the renounced share of the widow to pass into the residue instead of
being sequestered to compensate disappointed benefiiciaries. Technically the term "lapse" does not pertain to a widow's renounced share.
Rather, it refers to a legacy or devise "which fails because the devisee
or legatee has, in some way, become incapable of taking under the will
between the time that the will was made and the time that testator
died.30 However, the Wisconsin court justifies its holding by (1) indulging in ther presumption, which Professor Page has called fictitious,3 that the testator had the possibility of his widow's election in
mind when he drafted his will, and (2) reasoning from this presumption to the conclusion that the testator used the word "lapse" in a
broad sense so as to include the renounced gifts to the widow.
The use of the presumption in this case was particularly unjustified,
since the will under consideration was that of Roujet Marshall, a
former Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and a man of great
legal ability. The court itself says, "He was one of the most thoroughgoing, accurate, and exhaustive lawyers that has ever appeared at the
bar of Wisconsin. 32 It is the respectful opinion of the writer that, had
Judge Marshall actually contemplated his widow's election, his habits
of thoroughness would have prompted him to make express provision
for the disposition of the renounced gifts in the event of her election.
However, the result in Will of Marshall is just, since the residuary
28

Supra, note 24, at 316.

29 Ibfd.

PAGE, LAW OF WMLS 158 (3d ed. 1941).
31 Supra, note 7.
32 Will of Marshall, supra, note 6, at 172.
304
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beneficiaries, who were allowed to retain the renounced property, were
the most cherished of Judge Marshall's beneficiaries. Still, this decision is ample proof of the difficulties which may arise when a will
lacks provisions expressly covering the possibility of the widow's election. Without such provisions the will of Judge Marshall, who was
famed for his thoroughness and accuracy, had to be taken to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin for construction.
(3) Contribution to Disappointed Beneficiaries of Same or Different Class
Where compensation out of the renounced provisions has not been
allowed, or, if allowed, has been insufficient to make up the loss to
beneficiaries whose gifts were impaired, the question arises whether
such beneficiaries should receive contribution from other beneficiaries
of the same or a different class. One of the problems with respect to
contribution has already been answered in our consideration of how
Wisconsin apportions the widow's share of personalty when she takes
against the will. That is, the rule that the residue suffers the entire
loss if it is sufficient and there has been no expression of a contrary
intent,3 3 answers the question whether there is contribution between
beneficiaries of personalty.
However, the question whether beneficiaries of personalty receive
contribution from beneficiaries of land has not been considered. For
instance, does a residuary devisee, who loses one-third of non-homestead realty and/or an estate for the life of the widow or until her
remarriage in the homestead, 34 have to contribute to a residuary legatee
who loses out in greater proportion? Also, where the residual personalty is small and a general legatee consequently loses a larger proportion of his gift than that which devisees lose, is the general legatee
entitled to contribution from general and/or residuary devisees?
Regarding contribution to devisees, the following questions are
pertinent: (1) Do devisees get contribution from devisees or legatees
of lower classes? (2) Are specific or general devisees allowed contribution from legatees of the same class who have not lost out in the
same proportion?
None of the various aspects of contribution between beneficiaries
has ever been before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Therefore, we
must use cases from other jurisdictions to demonstrate the difficulties
peculiar to the problem of contribution.
(a) Contribution from Beneficiaries of Same Class
As pointed out above, in Wisconsin the questions of contribution
between beneficiaries of the same class are as follows: (1) Does a
3 Supra, note 10.
34 WIs. STATS. (1953) §233.14, 233.01, 237.02(2).
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residuary legatee who has lost out in greater proportion than a residuary devisee get contribution from the latter? (2) Is a general legatee
entitled to contribution from a general devisee who has not lost out in
the same proportion? (3) Does a general devisee get contribution
from a general legatee who has not lost as large a share of his gift?
(4) Does a specific devisee get contribution from a specific legatee
who has not lost out in as great a proportion? Note that the claims for
contribution are between legatees on the one hand and devisees on the
other.
The decided cases on the question of contribution between beneficiaries of the same class hold that- contribution should be allowed. 35
However, most of these cases involve disputes between devisee and
devisee or between legatee and legatee, since the widow's share has
been taken disproportionately from devisees or legatees of the same
class.3 6 In Wisconsin the widow's share is taken proportionately from
devisees or legatees of the same class, so these cases are clearly inapplicable. However, some of the cases do involve situations which
may occur in Wisconsin. For example, in Sandoe's Appeal3 7 the court
held, in effect, that a specific devisee should contribute to a specific
legatee. This decision is not too strong, though, since the court found
testamentary intent that the gifts to the devisee and legatee should be
equal in value. In In re Evans Estate,38 a Pennsylvania case where
the share allotted to the widow was similar to that given her in Wisconsin, the court said in a dictum that, if both devisees and legatees
are disappointed by the widow's election, it is the probate court's duty
to adjust the equity between the devisees and legatees "in such manner
that each shall bear his proper proportion of the loss, and no more."8 91
0
the Tennessee court put the loss
Lastly, in Robinson v. Harrison"
proportionately on specific devisees and legatees (there were no general
or residuary beneficiaries).
As to whether or not Wisconsin will follow this apparent tendency
to allow contribution between beneficiaries of the same class when the
dispute is between devisees on one"side and legatees on the other, we
can only speculate.
(b) Contribution from Beneficiaries of Lower Class
We have already indicated in the material introducing the problem
35

Henderson v. Green, 34 Iowa 437, 11 Am. Rep. 149 (1872) ; Latta v. Brown,
96 Tenn. 343, 34 S.W. 417 (1896) ; Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W.
176 (1915). See Notes, 99 A.L.R. 1187, 1190, 1191 (1935); 27 L.R.A. (N.S.)
605 (1910) ; Ann. Cas. 1913E 424, supp. Ann. Cas. 1918C 415.
36 For example, see Latta v. Brown, supra, note 35; Meek v. Trotter, supra,
note 35.
3765

Pa. 314 (1870).

38 150 Pa. 212, 24 A. 642 (1892).
39Ib;d., 24 A. at 643.
402 Tenn. Ch. 11 (1874).
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of contribution that the following questions arise in Wisconsin with
respect to contribution from beneficiaries of lower classes: (1) Should
devisees get contribution from devisees or legatees of lower classes?
(2) Is a general legatee whose gift is impaired entitled to contribution
from a residuary devisee?
Again we must look to the decisions of other jurisdictions to see
what the law is on these questions, since there are no Wisconsin cases
in point.
Where the gifts of specific beneficiaries have been impaired, some
of the cases hold that the disappointed beneficiaries are entitled to contribution from the general estate.41 The theory of these cases is:
"... that the testator must have meant that the persons to
whom he made specific gifts should receive these gifts unimpaired, and that the general and residuary legatees (the word
'legatees' is used here so as to include both devisees and
legatees) should take only in the event of there being property
available for the purpose ....
-42 (Italics added.)
However, there are a number of cases holding that specific beneficiaries should not be allowed contribution from beneficiaries of lower
classes,4 3 the rationale of these decisions being that:
".. -the
testator must be regarded as having made such
specific gifts subject to the possibility '44
of his widow's asserting
her legal rights in derogation thereof.
Where the gifts of general beneficiaries have been impaired by the
widow's election, there is also a split of authority regarding contribution from the residuary estate. Some of the cases allow contribution,
upon the ground that the possibility of residuary beneficiaries losing
out entirely is an unavoidable incident of a residuary gift.45 Other
decisions treat general and residuary gifts alike and apportion the loss
46
ratably between them.

How will the Wisconsin Supreme Court hold on the question of
contribution from beneficiaries of a lower class? A Wisconsin decision, Will of Muskat,4 7 has been cited for the proposition that a
Treasy v. Treasy, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 387, 36 S.W. 3 (1896) ; Mercantile Trust Co.
v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 166 A. 599 (1933); Tehan v. Tehan, 83 Hun. 368, 31
N.Y.S. 961 (1894). See Notes, 99 A.L.R. 1187, 1192-1195 (1935), 27 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 606 (1910); Ann. Cas. 1913E 425.
423 Note, 99 A.L.R. 1187, 1192 (1935).
4 Gainer v. Gates, 73 Iowa 149, 34 N.W. 798 (1887) ; Devecmon v. Kuykendall,
89 Md. 25, 42 A. 963 (1899) ; Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S.C. 396 (1883). See
Notes, 99 A.L.R. 1187, 1194, 1195 (1935) ; 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, 608.
44Supra, note 42.
45 Firth v. Denny, 2 Allen (Mass.) 468 (1861); Wallace v. Wallace, 15 W. Va.
722 (1879).
46McRae's Appeal, 179 Mich. 595, 146 N.W. 265 (1914); Re Byrnes, 149 Misc.
449, 267 N.Y.S. 627 (1933).
7 Supra, Note 10.
4'
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specific beneficiary is entitled to contribution from the residuary
estate, but this case did not involve the impairment Qf a specific gift,
so it is clearly not in point. The fact that residuary beneficiaries lose
out in Wisconsin concerning questions of abatement,4 8 suits against
will beneficiaries, 4 9 and apportionment of the widow's share of personalty when she takes against the will,50 would seem to indicate that
Wisconsin will require contribution from residuary beneficiaries. However, in the dicta of Will of Muskat" and Will of Marshall2 to which
we have already referred in regard to the question of sequestration, the
Wisconsin court put specific and residuary gifts on a par when it said
that there is no "substantial distortion" among testamentary gifts where
specific and residuary beneficiaries lose out in the same proportion and
that specific beneficiaries are therefore not entitled to compensation.
Consequently, we have factors pointing both ways in Wisconsin and
it is impossible to predict how our court will hold.
(c) Conclusion Regarding Contribution
Concluding our remarks on contribution, it is apparent that the
conflicts among the various jurisdictions and the difficulty in ascertaining what the position of the Wisconsin court will be, will foster needless litigation in our courts unless wills are drafted so as to express
the testator's intention with respect to contribution.
C. Tax Effects
The tax effects of a widow's election have already been considered.53 Ordinarily, there will be no tax advantage or disadvantage
when a widow takes against a will.5 4 However, under certain circum-

stances the widow gets an advantage regarding the federal estate tax.155
Under other circumstances her election causes an increase in the
federal estate tax.56 Thus, whether or not there will be an evil effect
tax-wise depends upon the facts in each case.
(To be continued)
WLIAM

48

49

50

A. GIGuRm

Supra, note 15.
Supra, note 16.

Supra, note 10.
51 Supra, note 10.
52 Supra, note 6.
53 See the first installment of this article, 37 MARQ. L. REv. 365, 371-373 (1954).
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., at 372.
r6 Ibid., at 373.

